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Occupational licensing provides an example of one of the essential tasks of democratic societies, which is to establish a proper balance between freedom and order.
The issue of the government regulation of occupations involves the role of government in reconciling the special interests of the practitioners with those of society. From this general principle of democratic governments, this policy brief examines the regulation of occupations by government and suggests that an implementation of policies that have begun by state governments might lead to more economic growth and jobs.
Occupational licensing is extensive and growing. In 2008, nearly 30 percent of the workforce was required to hold a license (Kleiner and Krueger 2010) , up from around 10 percent in 1970. Occupational regulation in the United States generally takes three forms. The least restrictive form is registration, in which individuals file their names, addresses, and qualifications with a government agency before practicing their occupation. The registration process may include posting a bond or filing a fee. In contrast, certification permits any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the government-or sometimes a private, nonprofit agency-administers an examination or other method determining qualifications and certifies those who have achieved the level of skill and knowledge for certification. For example, travel agents and car mechanics are generally certified but not licensed. The toughest form of regulation is licensure, which is often referred to as "the right to practice." Under licensure laws, working in an occupation for compensation without first meeting government standards is illegal. In 1992 the Council of State Governments estimated that more than 800 occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more than 1,100 occupations were licensed, certified, or registered (Brinegar and Schmitt 1992) .
It is well understood that occupational licensing can serve as a barrier to occupational entry resulting in reduced employment, monopoly rents for workers in the occupation, and higher prices for consumers (Friedman 1962 ). Kleiner and Krueger (2009) show that after controlling for education, labor market experience, occupation, and other controls, licensing is associated with a 15 percent wage premium in the labor market. This estimate may partially reflect a premium for higher unmeasured human capital, but it is also consistent and likely in large part due to rents associated with a "closed shop" that is a feature of occupational licensing.
There is little empirical work on the effects of licensing on employment levels or growth rates, but the existing estimates suggest that they could be large. Kleiner (2006) examines employment growth rates in states and occupations with stronger versus weaker occupational licensing requirements. Specifically, Kleiner compares employment growth of occupations that are licensed in some states to the same occupations that are not licensed in other states between the years 1990 and 2000. In order to account for differential growth rates between states, a comparison was made between the growth rate of occupations that are either fully licensed or fully unlicensed in both sets of states. This will result in slower adjustment costs to state labor market changes, which can result in higher unemployment (Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982) .
Because it restricts employment, licensing can also lead to higher prices for services faced by consumers. This has been documented in a number of studies, including Shepard (1978) , Bond et al. (1980) , Cox and Foster (1990) , and Kleiner and
Todd (2009).
While it is not possible to precisely estimate the effects of substantially reducing occupational licensing, the current evidence suggests that such a reduction could translate into significantly higher employment, better job matches, and improved customer satisfaction. Low-income consumers, in particular, would benefit because reduced barriers to entry would reduce the prices of services provided (Shapiro 1986; Cox and Foster 1990) . Suppose that the entire 15 percent wage premium for licensing is from rents (as opposed to human capital), labor supply is perfectly elastic, and the labor demand elasticity is 0.5. There are approximately 38 million licensed workers in the United States with average annual earnings of $41,000. Under these assumptions, licensing results in 2.85 million fewer jobs with an annual cost to consumers of $203 billion.
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Of course, these estimates do not take into account possible benefits from licensing. Licensing may result in higher-quality outcomes for those who obtain services, for example, because it requires a certain amount of education and training. It may also encourage greater investment in human capital because individuals will be able to recoup a higher return for their investment if they are not competing against lower-quality substitutes.
Without doing a detailed analysis at the occupation-by-occupation and state level, it would be difficult to say when licensing of certain occupations can be justified based on quality-consideration, though several studies have found a number of cases where licensing reduces employment, increases prices, but does not result in better services. For example, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find that more stringent occupational licensing of dentists does not lead to improved measured dental outcomes of patients, but is associated with higher prices of certain services, likely because there are fewer dentists. in Minnesota, it could serve as a template for other states, and as a consequence, many of the economic and job loss costs of occupational licensing could be substantially reduced.
